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Abstract 
This study investigates the role of information sharing offices and its association with market 
power in the African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 
banks from 42 countries for the period 2001-2011. Five simultaneity-robust estimation 
techniques are employed, namely: (i) Two Stage Least Squares; (ii) Instrumental Fixed effects 
to control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (iii) Instrumental Tobit regressions to control for 
the limited range in the dependent variable; (iv) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to 
control for persistence in market power and (v) Instrumental Quantile Regressions (QR) to 
account for initial levels of market power.  
The following findings have been established from non-interactive regressions. First, 
the effects of information sharing offices are significant in Two Stage Least Squares, with a 
positive effect from private credit bureaus. Second, in GMM, public credit registries increase 
market power.  Third, from Quintile Regressions, private credit bureaus consistently increase 
market power throughout the conditional distributions of market power. 
 Given that the above findings are contrary to theoretical postulations, we extended the 
analytical framework with interactive regressions in order to assess whether the anticipated 
effects can be established if information sharing offices are increased. The extended findings 
show a: (i) negative net effect from public credit registries on market power in GMM 
regressions and; (ii) negative net impacts from public credit registries on market power in the 
0.25
th
 and 0.50
th
 quintiles of market power.  
 
JEL Classification: G20; G29; L96; O40; O55 
Keywords: Financial access; Market power; Information asymmetry 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of bank efficiency and market power has been at the centre of economic research 
and analysis over the past three decades (see Townsend, 1979; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Neven & Roller, 1999; Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). The 
interest stems from the fact that market power may lead to inefficiency in the banking system, 
resulting in a net loss of social and economic welfare in the country (Maudo & Fernandez de 
Guevara, 2007).  Prior research evidence indicates that market power translates into a higher 
costs of financial intermediation, lower volume of savings and investment and consequently 
lower economic growth (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Djankov et al., 2007). Aware of the 
deleterious effects of market power on economic growth, governments and policy makers in 
both developed and developing countries have embarked on policies aimed at reducing the 
level of market power in banking markets to enhance competition. Prominent among the 
reform policies in sub-Saharan African context include the liberalisation of the banking sector 
under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In particular, the 
reform policies over the past decade have had a tremendous effect on competition in the 
banking and financial services landscape of many African countries. 
With the heightened competition in the banking sector in many African countries, 
many lending institutions have increasingly realised the essential role played by the credit 
information systems in improving banking efficiency. Indeed this realisation resonates with 
the mainstream economic theory that is, power theories of credit put forward and formalised 
by scholars such as Townsend (1979); Aghion and Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore 
(1994). The theories of credit suggest that two key factors influence how much private credit 
should be extended to firms and individuals by the financial systems. According to Townsend 
(1979) Aghion and Bolton (1992); Jaffee and Russell (1976); and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
the power of creditors (market power) and information are two key determinants which 
underpin all credit decisions. The argument here is that when lenders command dominant 
positions in the market, have a power to force repayment and credit history of potential 
borrowers, they are more willing to lend. It is pertinent to point out that, the establishment of 
information sharing offices and credit registries in African countries provides an impetus for 
credit expansion, increased competitions, reduced information asymmetry and bank efficiency 
in an environment dominated by big players such as Barclays bank, Standard Chartered bank; 
Société Générale and BNP Paribas. Moreover, the introduction of a credit information system 
has palpable implications for market power as transparency is increased and monopolistic 
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tendencies of large banks become difficult to conceal. Despite the perceived gains from the 
introduction of information sharing offices, recent stream of financial development literature 
in developing countries indicate that, large banks may continue to reap the benefits of the 
market power to the under-developed nature of credit information systems and the 
weaknesses inherent in information sharing among lenders. One such study is that of Luoto, 
McIntosh and Wydick (2007) which gives account of the growth in credit information 
systems in developing countries with specific reference to Guatemala. This study builds on 
this literature by investigating the relationship between information sharing offices and 
market power in African countries. We do so by analysing 162 banks from 42 African 
countries over the period of 2001-2011. 
Prior literature indicates that smaller banks are characterised with lower interest 
margins (see Beck & Hesse, 2006; Ahokpossi, 2013)
1
.  In essence, relative to small banks, 
financial institutions with high market power are supposed to reduce their interest margins 
because of internal and external economies of scale. Conversely, instead of improving in 
terms of efficiency, big banks are increasingly becoming inefficient (see Mitchell & Onvural, 
1996) and market power affects financial access (Karray & Chichti, 2013). A number of 
arguments have been used to explain the established paradox. The first argument advanced is 
that, instead of enhancing financial access, large banks use their market power to enjoy a 
‘quite life’ (see Mitchell & Onvural, 1996)2.   The second perspective is that certain large 
financial institutions can be linked to considerable diseconomies of scale that lead to 
inefficiencies in terms of poor management, organisation and coordination (Karray & Chichti, 
2013; Clark, 1996; Mester, 1992; Noulas et al., 1990; Berger et al., 1987). The third view 
maintains that big banks may be using information sharing offices to augment their profit 
margins (Brown & Zehnder, 2010).  
The position that big banks could be abusing their market power has motivated a 
recent stream of African development literature on the role of information sharing offices in 
financial access (see Barth et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016a; 
                                                          
1
 According to Beck and Hesse (2006, p.1), bank size substantially contributes to differences in interest rate 
spreads/margins in the banking sector. For example, in Kenya the high cost of loans is favourable to big banks 
compared to small lenders (see Ngigi, 2013a, b). Ahokpossi (2013, p. 1) has established that policies designed to 
promote competition and reduce market concentration would help lower interest margins in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). 
2 The Quiet Life Hypothesis is a postulation that, banks with greater market power would invest less in pursuing 
intermediation efficiency. In other words, instead of tailoring the advantage of their favorable position to enable 
more borrowers to obtain loans at affordable prices, they would prefer to ‘exploit their market power’ for more 
gains or enjoy a ‘quite life’ (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). 
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Tchamyou & Asongu, 2016). Unfortunately, the literature in this third stream is an 
embodiment of indirect investigations on the nexus between information sharing offices and 
market power because the outcome variables are indicators of financial access. In addition, 
Ariss (2010, p.766) states that “developing countries provide a fertile laboratory to examine 
issues of competition because they are engaged in a process of deregulation, bank 
privatization and financial liberalization, while the industry is witnessing more 
consolidation”. Furthermore, Luoto, McIntosh and Wydick (2007, p. 313) convey that “in 
many developing countries, credit information systems are still in their infancy, and 
information sharing among lenders remains weak”. They go on to report that “Africa remains 
the region of the world with the least developed credit information systems” (2007, p. 315).  
Accordingly, this inquiry complements the existing literature by directly investigating the 
effect of information sharing on market power in the African banking industry.  
Information sharing offices were introduced in Africa over the past decade in order to 
mitigate information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in the banking industry (Lin, 
Ma, Malatesta & Xuan, 2011). According to Jappelli and Pagano (2002), the theoretical 
connection between market power and information sharing is based on the expectation that 
the latter renders the banking sector contestable. They also report that increased information 
sharing offices intensifies interbank competition because information rents previously enjoyed 
by big banks are reduced by information sharing offices. Accordingly, by mitigating market 
power and making credit markets contestable, information sharing offices play the role of 
market brokers by ensuring inter alia: more competition for credit, efficiency in the allocation 
of capital and reduction of credit constraints.  
The theoretical underpinnings are broadly consistent with Bergemanny et al. (2015) on 
the nexus between information and market power.  A consumer with the demand curve who 
exercises market power by reducing or increasing his/her demands for a particular commodity 
can influence market price strategically. In the same vein, a producer with the supply curve 
can also strategically influence the market price by deciding on the amount of commodities to 
supply. In essence, the standard assessment of market power is the price effect: the 
responsiveness of price to consumer/producer demand/supply shifts. From a consumer 
perspective, marker power engenders inefficiency given that consumer marginal value is way 
higher than the price of the market. In the same vein, from the viewpoint of the producer, the 
supply price exceeds the marginal cost of production. According to the authors, the 
mainstream understanding of market power is founded on information asymmetry. This 
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theoretical underpinning is consistent with our inquiry in the perspectives that: (i) market 
power in the banking industry is measured as the rate at which the price of loans exceeds 
marginal cost and (ii) reducing information asymmetry is measured with information sharing 
offices. 
 The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 covers the data and 
methodology while the empirical results and discussion are provided in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes with implications and future research directions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 The study assesses a panel of 162 banks in 42 African countries with data from the 
World Bank Development Indicators and Bankscope for the period 2001-2011. The number 
of banks, countries and periodicity are because of constraints in data availability. Information 
sharing data is only available from the year 2001. The choice of countries and banks is 
motivated by data availability constraints. Triki and Gajigo (2014) have recently adopted a 
similar dataset.  
 Consistent with Ariss (2010), the Lerner index is used as a measurement of market 
power. The index measures the rate at which financial institutions set prices above marginal 
cost. Therefore higher Lerner indices reflect greater market power. The procedure for 
computing the index is discussed in Section 2.1.1.  
 In accordance with Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007, p. 303), information sharing offices are measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) 
and public credit registries (PCR). This study’s control variables include: (i) market-oriented 
characteristics (GDP per capita growth, inflation and population density); (ii) bank-level 
features (loan quantity, loan price, Bank branches and Deposits/Assets) and (iii) the 
unobserved bank heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity is articulated in terms of bank: 
‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-Islamic versus (vs) Islamic); size (large vs. small) and 
ownership (foreign vs. domestic).  The choice of these control variables is consistent with 
recent information sharing literature in the African banking industry (see Asongu & Le Roux, 
2016).  
 Looking at the anticipated signs from bank-oriented features, the following can be 
expected. (1) We anticipate loan price to increase market power because high interest margins 
resulting from higher loan prices can be a reflection of abuse of power by big banks. (2) 
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Growing loan quantity can indicate decreasing market power owing to intensive competition 
within the banking sector that drives-down prices while simultaneously augmenting loan 
quantity.  We cannot establish with certainty the anticipate signs because increasing quantity 
of loans may as well as be the outcome of a group of banks making decisions to influence the 
quantity of loans to be circulated within the banking sector. (3) The ‘Deposit to asset ratio’ 
can positively or negatively influence market power because it can increase the quantity of 
loans and price of loans at the same time. Accordingly, given that the main sources of bank 
financing are deposits, a higher proportion of deposits among liquid liabilities can increase the 
interest rate margin and quantity of loans at the same time. (4) While a growing number of 
‘bank branches’ is an indication of banking sector competition, the corresponding growth in 
bank branches could also be the outcome of large banks increasing their outreach. Therefore, 
it is difficult to ascertain the direction of causality flowing from bank branches to market 
power.  
 The following can be postulated on the expected signs from market-related 
characteristics.  (1) While GDP per capita growth is employed to account for business cycle 
fluctuations, the sign of its relationship with market power is difficult to establish because the 
effect depends on market expansion and dynamism. (2) It is very probable that the density of 
the population decreases the market power enjoyed by certain banks because it confers 
opportunities of investment in the banking sector. (3) Whereas high inflation could constrain 
some banks to quit the banking industry, stable/low inflation which is necessary for 
investment purposes could be an attraction for banks to set-up more bank branches across an 
economy. Accordingly, inflation is an important source of economic ambiguity and investors 
have been documented to be more inclined towards investment climates that are less 
ambiguous (see Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 2016).  
 It is not an easy task to establish expected signs from the dummy variables employed 
to account for the unobserved heterogeneity. (1) From logic and common sense, a growing 
number of small banks can decrease market power. (2) An increasing density in domestic 
banks can either positively or negatively affect market power because the impact depends on 
inter alia: concerns about inefficiency as well as issues about organisation and co-ordination. 
(3) The impact of compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-islamic vs. Islamic) is also not easy 
to establish because such an influence is contingent on inter alia: (i) organisational capacities 
of staff; (ii) dynamism and expansion of markets and (iii) constraints in fulfilling the 
requirements and needs of customers. 
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 The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 
presents the summary statistics whereas the correlation matrix is disclosed in Appendix 3.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Estimation of Market Power (Lerner Index)  
 The stochastic frontier model is employed in order to estimate the Lerner index which 
is the indicator of market power (see Battese & Coelli, 1992). Coccorese and Pellecchia 
(2010) have argued that the model is better in comparison to other estimation techniques like 
approaches based on deterministic frontiers (see Aigner & Chu, 1968; Farrell, 1957). The 
selected empirical strategy accounts for the possibility that, beside the corporations’ 
inefficiency, deviations between the observed output and the frontier output could derive from 
other factors like stochastic shocks and measurement errors.  
 Let us assume that for firm i  at time t , production costs depend on input prices (W ), 
output ( Q ), random error ( v ) and inefficiency ( u ).  
If the inefficiency and random error terms are identically and independently distributed (iid), 
the logarithmic specification corresponding to the cost function can be presented as follows: 
 
 ititititit uvWQfC  ),(ln  ,                                                                          (1)      
where the error term and non-negative inefficiency terms are iid, following a normal 
distribution and a truncated normal distribution respectively. Hence, while itv  is 
²),0( vN  , itu  is ²),( uN  .       
The translog cost function is used to model the cost. It consists of one output and three inputs. 
The function was first proposed by Christensen et al. (1971) and later extended to a 
multiproduct framework  by Brown et al. (1979). It has been widely applied in contemporary 
empirical literature (see Koetter & Vins, 2008; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 2010).  
 
The cost function is as follows:  
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where Ni ,........1  and  Tt .........1 , are subscripts of banks and time respectively.
 
C is 
the total cost,  Q  is the output, hW  are factor prices, while itu  and itv  are respectively the 
error and inefficiency terms.  
 In order to estimate the cost, one output and three inputs are specified. The total 
operating cost is appreciated with the following: price of capital, price of labor, inputs by the 
price of deposits, output by total assets and total operating cost measured with overheads
3
. 
The Lerner index is then computed from the marginal cost and price (see Eq. 4). Whereas the 
former is derived from the translog cost function output (see Eq. (3)), the latter represents the 
price charged by banks on their output (total assets) and it is computed as the ratio of total 
revenues (net noninterest income plus interest income) to total assets.  
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where itP  is the price charged by a bank on its output. Accordingly, in theory the Lerner 
index can vary between 0 (in case of perfect competition) and 1. 
 
2.2 2 Instrumentation and instrumental Fixed effects estimations   
 
 Five simultaneity-robust estimation techniques are employed, namely: (i) Two Stage 
Least Squares; (ii) Instrumental Variable (IV)
4
 Fixed Effects to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity; (iii) IV Tobit regressions to control for the limited range in the dependent 
variable; (iv) Generalised Method of Moments to control for persistence in market power and 
(v) IV Variable Quantile regressions to account for initial levels of market power. The 
employment of multiple estimation techniques is in accordance with data behaviour (Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
The issue of endogeneity in the independent ‘information sharing office’ variables is 
tackled by instrumenting the corresponding public credit registries and private credit bureaus 
with their first lags. For instance, the procedure for instrumenting private credit bureaus is as 
follows in Eq. (5) below. 
 
                                                          
3
 The deposit price is calculated by dividing interest expenses by the sum of deposits, short term funding plus 
money market. The price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The price of capital 
is equal to the ratio of ‘other operating costs’ to the value of fixed assets.  
4
 Instrumental Variable and Instrumental are used interchangeably throughout the study.   
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  titijti PCBPCB ,1,,      ,                                                                                              (5) 
where tiPCB , , is the private credit bureaus indicator of bank i  
at  period t ,    is a constant, 
1, tiPCB , represents  private credit bureaus in bank i  
at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error term.  
The instrumentation procedure in Eq. (5) consists of regressing private credit bureaus on their 
first lags, then saving the fitted values that are later used as the independent variable of 
interest in Two Stage Least Squares, Fixed effects, Tobit and Quantile Regression 
specifications. The instrumentation process which is replicated for public credit registries is  
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. 
 The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) panel Fixed Effects (FE) models are presented 
respectively in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) as follows: 
titih
h
htititi WPCBPCRL ,,,
10
1
,2,10,    

                                                                       (6) 
tiitih
h
htititi WPCBPCRL ,,,
7
1
,2,10,    

  ,                                                              (7) 
where, tiL ,  
is the Lerner index of bank i
 
at  period t ,  is a constant,
 
PCR  is public credit 
registries,    PCB represents pubic credit bureaus,
 
W  is the vector of control variables  ( ICT, 
loan price, loan quantity, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, 
Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks),
 i

 
is the 
country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term. The vector of control variables does not include 
dummy fixed effects (Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks) because these are by 
definition incorporated into country-specific effects in the FE model.  
 
2.2.3 Generalised method of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions 
  
 There are four main reasons for adopting a GMM technique. First, the N>T (162>11) 
criterion that is essential for the application of the estimation approach is met given that the 
number of banks (or cross sections) is substantially higher than the number of time series in 
each cross section. Second, cross-country variations are not eliminated from the 
specifications. (3) The estimation approach has some bite on endogeneity because it accounts 
for simultaneity. Furthermore the use of time-invariant omitted variables                                                                                                   
also increases the control for endogeneity. (4) The system estimator corrects for biases in the 
difference estimator.  
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  In accordance with Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1995)  and Blundell and Bond (1998) has better estimation properties 
when compared with the  difference estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Within 
the framework of this inquiry, we prefer the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) because it has been documented to:  (i) account for cross-sectional dependence 
and (ii) restrict over-identification or instrument proliferation (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008; Asongu & De Moor, 2016). In essence, the technique adopts forward 
orthogonal deviations instead of first differences. The adopted specification approach is two-
step because it controls for heteroscedasticity. It is important to note that the one-step 
approach is homoscedasticity-consistent.   
The following equations in level (8) and first difference (9) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where,  represents the coefficient of auto-regression and t  
is the time-specific constant.   
 It is important to briefly engage exclusion and identification restrictions. As 
documented in recent literature, all explanatory variables are acknowledged as predetermined 
or suspected endogenous while only time-invariant omitted variables are considered as strictly 
exogenous (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). This is essentially because it is not feasible 
for time-invariant omitted variables (or years) to become endogenous in first-differences (see 
Roodman, 2009b). Hence, the process for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ 
whereas the gmmstyle is used for predetermined variables.  
 Given the above insights, time-invariant omitted variables (which are considered to be 
strictly exogenous) influence the Lerner index exclusively via the predetermined indicators. 
Moreover, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. In essence, the null 
hypothesis of this test should not be rejected for the time-invariant omitted variables to 
explain the Lerner index exclusively via the endogenous explaining variables. Therefore, 
while in the standard instrumental variable (IV) approach, failure to reject the null hypothesis 
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of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test indicates that the instruments do not 
explain the outcome variable beyond the suspected endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 
2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), with the GMM technique (based on forward 
orthogonal variations), the information criterion needed to investigate if time-invariant 
omitted variables are strictly exogenous is the DHT. Therefore, in the findings that are 
revealed in Section 3, this assumption of exclusion restriction is confirmed if the alternative 
hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is  rejected. 
 
2.2.4 Instrumental Tobit regressions  
 The Lerner index theoretically is in the interval of 0 to 1. For this theoretical range, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach may not be appropriate for estimation. A double-
censored Tobit model has been proposed by many authors to account for the limited range in 
the outcome variable (see Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000; Koetter et al., 2008; Coccorese & 
Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 2010).  Moreover, if no observations are of either 0 or 1 are apparent 
(as it is the case with the Lerner index), estimations by a double-censored Tobit model is 
similar to estimating by a linear regression model because the two likelihood functions 
coincide (McDonald, 2009; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c).  
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun & Sun, 2007) is as follows: 
 
                                                         tititi Xy ,,0
*
,    ,                                                 (10) 
 
where *,tiy is a latent response variable, tiX ,  
is an observed k1 vector of explanatory variables 
and ti,  
i.i.d. N(0, σ2) and is independent variable  of tiX , . Instead of observing
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                                                     (11) 
 
where  is a non stochastic constant. In other words, the value of *,tiy is missing when it is less 
than or equal to   . 
 
2.2.5 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
 The preceding modelling approaches are based on mean values of the Lerner index. 
Unfortunately, mean values reflect blanket policies. Moreover, such blanket policies may be 
ineffective unless they are contingent on initial levels of market power and specified 
differently across financial institutions with high, intermediate and low market power. The 
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concern about modelling exclusively at the conditional mean of the outcome variable is 
addressed with Quantile Regressions (QR) which enables the study to assess the nexuses 
throughout the conditional distributions of market power (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; 
Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013). Such a technique has recently 
been employed to examine the relationship between information sharing and financial access 
(see Asongu et al., 2016b).  
 Cognizant of above facts, inquiries that investigate mean effects with Ordinary Least 
Squares are founded on the hypothesis of error terms that are normally distributed. Such an 
assumption of normally distributed errors terms is not valid in the QR technique. The 
estimation approach is robust in the presence of outliers because it enables the assessment of 
parameter estimates at various points of the conditional distribution of the outcome variable 
(or Lerner index) (see Koenker & Bassett, 1978).   
The  th quintile estimator of the Lerner index is obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (12) 
   






 
 







ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
 ,                                                      (12) 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
instance, the 10
th
 or 90
th
 quintiles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) are investigated by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of the Lerner index or iy given 
ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                                 (13) 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are assessed only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the Lerner index. In Eq. (13), the dependent variable 
iy  is the Lerner index whereas ix  contains a constant term, public credit registries, private 
credit bureaus, loan price, loan quantity, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population 
density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small banks, domestic banks and Islamic banks.  
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3. Empirical results 
3.1 Presentation of results  
  
Table 1 presents the findings of Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effects and Tobit regressions. 
Given that we are employing instrumental variables for the independent indicators of interest, 
the corresponding estimation technique can be qualified as respectively Two Stage Least 
Squares, Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variable Tobit regressions.  
The table entails nine specifications, with three specifications for each estimation strategy. 
Whereas the first and second specifications for each estimation approach respectively, 
articulate the effects of public credit registries and private credit bureaus, the third 
specification emphasises both the effects of private credit bureaus and public credit registries.  
 The following findings can be established. First, the effects of information sharing 
offices are significant only in the Two Stage Least Squares, with a positive (insignificantly 
positive) effect from private credit bureaus (public credit registries). Second, most of the 
significant control variables have the expected signs. For instance: (i) an increasing number of 
small banks reduce market power because as small banks enter the banking industry, they 
reduce the market share of operating big banks; (ii) domestic banks are likely to increase 
market power because the presence of foreign competition is needed to reduce the power 
enjoyed by big banks and (iii) increasing loan prices may be translated as growing market 
power because of the higher interest margins. The third point on loan prices is consistent with 
the conception and definition of market power: the setting of prices above marginal cost.  
Table 2 presents GMM results. The table entails six specifications, with one set of two 
specifications for public credit registries, private credit bureaus and information sharing 
offices. Each set of specification involves both a full sample and a partial sample. The full 
sample is from 2001-2011 whereas the partial sample is from 2005-2011. Two reasons 
motivate the adoption of the partial sample. On the one hand, it enables the inquiry to restrict 
over-identification or limit instrument proliferation given that T (time) is reduced. On the 
other hand, information from private credit bureaus and public credit registries in most of the 
sampled nations are available from the year 2005. Four principal information criteria are 
employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations
5
. 
Based on the information criteria, public credit registries increase market power.  
                                                          
5 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
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Table 1: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry  
          
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
 Two Stage  Least Squares Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable Tobit 
 PCR PCB ISO PCR PCB ISO PCR PCB ISO 
Constant  0.244 0.270 0.229 -1.707*** -1.550*** -1.709*** 0.234 0.274 0.219 
 (0.269) (0.203) (0.320) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.172) (0.100) (0.209) 
PCR (IV) 0.003 --- 0.004 -0.0002 --- 0.0004 0.003 --- 0.004 
 (0.224)  (0.164) (0.959)  (0.934) (0.469)  (0.403) 
PCB (IV) --- 0.001** 0.001*** --- 0.005 0.006 --- 0.001 0.001 
  (0.016) (0.007)  (0.340) (0.345)  (0.387) (0.360) 
GDPpcg -0.0004 0.0009 0.0007 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.0009 0.0009 0.0003 
 (0.879) (0.781) (0.821) (0.554) (0.634) (0.621) (0.904) (0.896) (0.969) 
Inflation  -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008* -0.008* -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.188) (0.214) (0.254) (0.107) (0.068) (0.083) (0.163) (0.112) (0.250) 
Pop. density -0.0002* -0.00001 -0.0001 -0.016*** -0.017** -0..017** -0.0002 0.000007 -0.0001 
 (0.080) (0.924) (0.218) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.339) (0.973) (0.490) 
Deposit/Assets 0.133 0.140 0.152 0.119 -0.020 -0.002 0.134 0.135 0.153 
 (0.537) (0.511) (0.501) (0.636) (0.938) (0.993) (0.348) (0.348) (0.301) 
Bank Branches 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** -0.038 -0.042* -0.044* 0.010* 0.009* 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.119) (0.083) (0.084) (0.069) (0.061) (0.145) 
Price of Loans  2.158 1.794 2.080 7.610*** 8.093*** 8.193*** 2.170*** 1.773*** 2.096*** 
 (0.107) (0.155) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.019 -0.023 -0.022 0.760*** 0.755*** 0.767*** -0.019 -0.023 -0.021 
 (0.330) (0.264) (0.297) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.274) (0.326) 
Small Banks  -0.128** -0.131** -0.133** --- --- --- -0.132* 0.207*** -0.137* 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.025)    (0.074) (0.000) (0.069) 
Domestic Banks 0.211** 0.210** 0.211** --- --- --- 0.210*** 0.077 0.210*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.035)    (0.000) (0.647) (0.001) 
Islamic Banks  0.064 0.076 0.080 --- --- --- 0.067 0.001 0.082 
 (0.430) (0.348) (0.340)    (0.686) (0.387) (0.629) 
          
Fisher  3.80*** 4.92*** 4.35*** 11.44*** 11.84*** 10.22***    
R²/R² within/Pseudo R² 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.152 0.157 0.158 0.027 0.027 0.028 
LR Chi-Square       35.49*** 35.12*** 35.92*** 
Log Likelihood       -631.181 -632.351 -620.846 
Banks    137 137 137    
Observations  652 652 633 653 653 634 652 652 633 
          
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private 
Credit Bureaus. ISO: Information Sharing Offices.  
 
Table 3 presents QR findings corresponding respectively to public credit registries, 
private credit bureaus and information sharing offices in three blocks of specifications. 
Apparent differences in estimation coefficients of the independent variables of interest (in 
terms of sign, significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of 
complementing the Two-Stage Least Squares, Fixed effects, Tobit and GMM regressions with 
estimations throughout the conditional distribution of the Lerner index. It is apparent from the 
results that private credit bureaus consistently increase market power throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9). 
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conditional distribution of market power. Most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs.  
 
Table 2: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM) 
       
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
       
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices  
 Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample 
Constant  0.304* -0.821 0.322** 0.109 0.436*** 0.032 
 (0.060) (0.243) (0.034) (0.374) (0.001) (0.944) 
Lener Index (-1) 0.194*** 0.546*** 0.176*** 0.584*** 0.168*** 0.556*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR  0.0005 -0.0006 --- --- 0.001* -0.001 
 (0.475) (0.703)   (0.063) (0.353) 
PCB  --- --- -0.00003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
   (0.978) (0.654) (0.922) (0.865) 
GDPpcg -0.003 0.002 -0.004* 0.001 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.183) (0.409) (0.070) (0.499) (0.155) (0.121) 
Inflation  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.476) (0.487) (0.152) (0.663) (0.162) (0.281) 
Pop. density -0.00003 0.00008 -0.0001 0.00004 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.776) (0.568) (0.410) (0.620) (0.210) (0.190) 
Deposit/Assets -0.125 -0.068 -0.108 0.064 -0.153 -0.062 
 (0.327) (0.771) (0.384) (0.691) (0.131) (0.702) 
Bank Branches 0.005** 0.002 0.008*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.004** 
 (0.023) (0.305) (0.002) (0.161) (0.000) (0.040) 
Price of Loans  0.610 0.300 1.231** 0.231 1.202** 0.308 
 (0.371) (0.644) (0.033) (0.609) (0.011) (0.652) 
Quantity of Loans  0.058** 0.058*** 0.018 0.041*** 0.014 0.045*** 
 (0.049) (0.002) (0.447) (0.005) (0.550) (0.001) 
AR(1) (0.166) (0.134) (0.139) (0.134) (0.147) (0.690) 
AR(2) (0.561) (0.161) (0.530) (0.629) (0.483) (0.964) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.156) (0.000) (0.173) 
Hansen OIR (0.195) (0.534) (0.120) (0.732) (0.149) (0.519) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.885) (0.930) (0.215) (0.912) (0.835) (0.494) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.082) (0.307) (0.151) (0.522) (0.058) (0.478) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.175) (0.577) (0.151) (0.607) (0.205) (0.503) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.352) (0.383) (0.222) (0.707) (0.210) (0.453) 
       
Fisher  26.09*** 13.84*** 20.07*** 27.21*** 27.07*** 26.44*** 
Instruments  34 33 34 32 38 37 
Banks  133 99 133 98 133 93 
Observations  603 124 594 122 584 117 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
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Table 3: Market Power and Reducing Information Asymmetry (IV QR) 
                
 
Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
                
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices 
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.110 0.405*** 0.670*** 0.732*** 0.783*** -0.014 0.397*** 0.690*** 0.802*** 0.817*** -0.056 0.400*** 0.689*** 0.739*** 0.787*** 
 (0.555) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.907) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.645) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR (IV) -0.002 -0.003 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0005 
 (0.620) (0.197) (0.669) (0.762) (0.276)      (0.253) (0.866) (0.383) (0.781) (0.598) 
PCB (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.0009** 0.001*** 
      (0.136) (0.008) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.038) (0.041) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.004 -0.001 -0.0009 0.00008 -0.0003 -0.004 0.0008 -0.0002 0.00005 -0.00003 -0.003 -0.0002 0.0001 0.001 0.0008 
 (0.548) (0.757) (0.599) (0.967) (0.859) (0.378) (0.847) (0.849) (0.981) (0.986) (0.519) (0.963) (0.922) (0.627) (0.627) 
Inflation  -0.005 -0.0007 0.000003 0.001 0.0006 -0.002 0.001 0.00004 0.002** 0.001 0.0001 0.0008 -0.00006 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.175) (0.806) (0.998) (0.094) (0.593) (0.515) (0.696) (0.958) (0.029) (0.311) (0.973) (0.786) (0.940) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pop. density -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.00001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.00002 0.00004 0.0001* 0.0001 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00007 0.00009 
 (0.665) (0.244) (0.057) (0.051) (0.829) (0.395) (0.391) (0.617) (0.566) (0.070) (0.565) (0.757) (0.225) (0.371) (0.266) 
Deposit/Assets 0.023 -0.068 -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.081** -0.015 -0.054 -0.092*** -0.124*** -0.038 -0.043 -0.044 -0.102*** -0.119*** -0.042 
 (0.886) (0.465) (0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.900) (0.556) (0.002) (0.002) (0.221) (0.703) (0.659) (0.000) (0.001) (0.162) 
Bank Branches 0.011* 0.008** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.009** 0.005 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.053) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.148) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.659) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Price of Loans  1.494 0.333 -0.219 -0.479** -0.335 1.189** 0.169 -0.364** -0.851*** -0.614** 1.460** 0.254 -0.291** -0.556** -0.554** 
 (0.117) (0.439) (0.192) (0.013) (0.175) (0.039) (0.690) (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) (0.026) (0.586) (0.032) (0.010) (0.015) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.010* 0.019 0.0008 -0.009** -0.005 0.0001 0.018 -0.0003 -0.009** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.916) (0.817) (0.363) (0.564) (0.069) (0.210) (0.946) (0.027) (0.416) (0.985) (0.214) (0.981) (0.027) (0.712) (0.692) 
Small Banks  0.074 -0.035 -0.033* -0.006 -0.048** -0.083* -0.045 -0.040*** -0.019 -0.053*** -0.072 -0.047 -0.039*** -0.019 -0.054*** 
 (0.287) (0.422) (0.061) (0.735) (0.015) (0.090) (0.293) (0.008) (0.386) (0.004) (0.123) (0.324) (0.006) (0.313) (0.002) 
Domestic Banks 0.125** 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.026* 0.023 0.174*** 0.074** 0.060*** 0.035* 0.021 0.155*** 0.094** 0.057*** 0.029* 0.015 
 (0.039) (0.002) (0.000) (0.066) (0.136) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.058) (0.156) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.059) (0.296) 
Islamic Banks  0.053 -0.027 -0.074* 0.033 0.003 0.089 0.001 -0.056* 0.013 0.021 0.111 -0.009 -0.054* 0.025 0.027 
 (0.734) (0.796) (0.074) (0.409) (0.925) (0.416) (0.988) (0.095) (0.782) (0.555) (0.287) (0.936) (0.087) (0.532) (0.445) 
                
Pseudo R² 0.052 0.036 0.045 0.057 0.079 0.059 0.042 0.058 0.070 0.096 0.058 0.041 0.055 0.065 0.088 
Observations  652 622 652 622 652 652 652 652 652 652 633 633 633 633 633 
                
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least.  
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3.2 Extended assessment: increasing information sharing offices 
 Given that the effects of information sharing offices on market power are 
overwhelmingly positive, we extend the investigation by interacting information sharing to 
assess whether increasing information sharing offices could lead to the anticipated theoretical 
negative effects. Hence, we replicate the regressions with interactive specifications and 
compute the corresponding net effects. In Table 4 for instance, the net effect corresponding to 
the first GMM specification is -0.0047 (([0.0001 × 2.056] + (-0.005)). In the computation, 
2.056 is the mean value of public credit registries, -0.005 is the unconditional effect of public 
credit registries while 0.0001 is the corresponding unconditional impact from the interaction 
between public credit registries. 
  
Table 4: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry  
           
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
           
 2SLS IV Fixed Effects IV Tobit GMM 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCR PCB PCB 
Constant  0.248 0.273 -1.702*** -1.521*** 0.239 0.277* 0.411*** 0.204 0.414*** -0.042 
 (0.312) (0.192) (0.001) (0.007) (0.171) (0.097) (0.000) (0.370) (0.000) (0.738) 
Lener Index (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.162*** 0.436*** 0.154*** 0.494*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.005** -0.002 --- --- 
       (0.041) (0.475)   
PCB  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 0.003 
         (0.198) (0.228) 
PCR*PCR --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** -0.00007 --- --- 
       (0.009) (0.424)   
PCB*PCB --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00003* -0.00005 
         (0.064) (0.241) 
PCR (IV) 0.002 --- -0.009 --- 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.787)  (0.576)  (0.846)      
PCB (IV) --- -0.001 --- 0.016 --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.767)  (0.384)  (0.903)     
PCR(IV)*PCR(IV) 0.00003 --- 0.0001 --- 0.0003 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.872)  (0.565)  (0.875)      
PCB(IV)*PCB(IV) --- 0.00004 --- -0.0001 --- 0.00004 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.538)  (0.552)  (0.790)     
GDPpcg -0.0003 0.0009 0.005 0.002 -0.0007 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.903) (0.770) (0.556) (0.775) (0.918) (0.891) (0.169) (0.579) (0.108) (0.517) 
Inflation  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008* -0.006 -0.007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.161) (0.214) (0.101) (0.065) (0.161) (0.111) (0.401) (0.654) (0.413) (0.750) 
Pop. density -0.0002 -0.00001 -0.017*** -0.017** -0.0002 0.000001 -0.00009 -0.00003 -0.0001 0.000005 
 (0.111) (0.879) (0.007) (0.012) (0.338) (0.996) (0.332) (0.760) (0.243) (0.961) 
Deposit/Assets 0.131 0.140 0.129 -0.014 0.132 0.135 -0.0007 -0.169 -0.053 0.017 
 (0.561) (0.512) (0.607) (0.956) (0.359) (0.351) (0.991) (0.219) (0.544) (0.911) 
Bank Branches 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.036 -0.045* 0.010* 0.009* 0.005*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.138) (0.070) (0.072) (0.059) (0.002) (0.013) (0.000) (0.087) 
Price of Loans  2.148 1.827 7.600*** 8.070*** 2.158*** 1.804*** -0.199 -0.075 0.276 0.436 
 (0.123) (0.159) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.595) (0.803) (0.356) (0.116) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.020 -0.023 0.761*** 0.743*** -0.019 -0.023 0.024 0.047*** 0.012 0.028** 
 (0.312) (0.267) (0.000) (0.000) (0.359) (0.264) (0.115) (0.000) (0.488) (0.018) 
Small Banks  -0.128** -0.133** --- --- -0.132* -0.131* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.023) (0.023)   (0.073) (0.074)     
Domestic Banks 0.211** 0.210** --- --- 0.209*** 0.208*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.033) (0.033)   (0.000) (0.000)     
Islamic Banks  0.063 0.074 --- --- 0.066 0.075 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.465) (0.351)   (0.692) (0.656)     
           
Net Effects of PCR n.a --- n.a --- n.a --- -0.0047 --- n.a --- 
Net Effects of PCB --- n.a --- n.a --- n.a --- n.a --- n.a 
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AR(1) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.360) (0.071) (0.317) (0.280) 
AR(2) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.702) (0.108) (0.616) (0.274) 
Sargan OIR --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.112) (0.382) (0.071) (0.828) 
DHT for instruments           
(a)Instruments in levels           
H excluding group --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.371) (0.342) (0.185) (0.819) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.092) (0.425) (0.101) (0.680) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))           
H excluding group --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.060) (0.446) (0.015) (0.628) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.605) (0.288) (0.946) (0.978) 
           
R²/R² within/Pseudo R² 0.052 0.053 0.153 0.157 0.027 0.027 --- --- --- --- 
LR Chi-Square --- --- --- --- 35.52*** 35.19*** --- --- --- --- 
Log Likelihood --- --- --- --- -631.169 -632.315 --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  4.30*** 4.49*** 10.19*** 10.55*** --- --- 52.54*** 64.32*** 38.23*** 54.39 *** 
Instruments  --- --- --- --- --- --- 46 45 46 43 
Banks   137 137   133 99 133 98 
Observations  652 652 653 653 652 652 603 124 594 122 
           
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the 
AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. n.a: not applicable because at least one of the estimated 
coefficients needed for the computation of net effects is not significant.  2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. IV: Instrumental Variable. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.   
 
 
Table 5: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (QR) 
           
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.178 0.480*** 0.724*** 0.736*** 0.794*** -0.024 0.389*** 0.695*** 0.793*** 0.833*** 
 (0.300) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.833) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR (IV) -0.009 -0.031** -0.010*** -0.003 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.333) (0.018) (0.000) (0.283) (0.609)      
PCB (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 0.004 0.007 0.003* 0.007** 0.004* 
      (0.377) (0.108) (0.064) (0.020) (0.079) 
PCR(IV)*PCR(IV) 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0002*** 0.00007 0.00005 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.151) (0.017) (0.000) (0.280) (0.397)      
PCB(IV)*PCB(IV) --- --- --- --- --- -0.00004 -0.00008 -0.00003 -0.0001* -0.00007 
      (0.623) (0.270) (0.244) (0.052) (0.151) 
GDPpcg -0.005 -0.001 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.00004 -0.002 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.000005 
 (0.439) (0.764) (0.823) (0.877) (0.983) (0.583) (0.831) (0.846) (0.819) (0.998) 
Inflation  -0.005 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.001 0.0006 -0.001 0.001 0.00001 0.003** 0.001 
 (0.143) (0.834) (0.625) (0.152) (0.638) (0.505) (0.558) (0.987) (0.018) (0.382) 
Pop. density -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.000008 0.0001 0.0001 -0.000009 0.00005 0.0001* 
 (0.379) (0.022) (0.000) (0.058) (0.935) (0.256) (0.354) (0.836) (0.503) (0.065) 
Deposit/Assets -0.022 -0.066 -0.146*** -0.112*** -0.102*** -0.014 -0.049 -0.089*** -0.126*** -0.065* 
 (0.880) (0.419) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.900) (0.556) (0.002) (0.001) (0.055) 
Bank Branches 0.011** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.009** 0.005 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.043) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.105) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Price of Loans  1.364 0.126 -0.336** -0.498** -0.339 1.007* 0.047 -0.415*** -0.926*** -0.701*** 
 (0.129) (0.744) (0.019) (0.021) (0.232) (0.059) (0.903) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.010* 0.022 0.002 -0.010** -0.002 0.002 
 (0.912) (0.928) (0.227) (0.584) (0.090) (0.111) (0.863) (0.016) (0.746) (0.737) 
Small Banks  -0.085 -0.058 -0.029** -0.012 -0.044* -0.068 -0.036 -0.042*** -0.013 -0.050** 
 (0.187) (0.147) (0.056) (0.535) (0.060) (0.128) (0.367) (0.004) (0.556) (0.010) 
Domestic Banks 0.132** 0.112*** 0.066*** 0.029* 0.026 0.161*** 0.067** 0.062*** 0.021 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.001) (0.000) (0.079) (0.138) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.236) (0.194) 
Islamic Banks  0.032 -0.052 -0.019*** 0.035 -0.010 0.080 0.001 -0.056* 0.015 0.010 
 (0.826) (0.572) (0.008) (0.409) (0.818) (0.425) (0.985) (0.085) (0.749) (0.791) 
           
Net Effects of PCR n.a -0.030 -0.009 n.a n.a --- --- --- --- --- 
Net Effects of PCB --- --- --- --- --- n.a n.a n.a 0.007 n.a 
           
Pseudo R² 0.056 0.048 0.054 0.057 0.079 0.059 0.045 0.058 0.073 0.100 
Observations  652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 
           
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. n.a: not applicable because at least one of the estimated coefficients needed for the computation of net effects is 
not significant. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.   
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 Table 4 presents Two Stage Least Squares, IV Fixed Effects, IV Tobit and GMM 
regressions. From the findings, only the net effect from public credit registries corresponding 
to the full sample is negative. It is important to note that for the GMM block, like in the 
baseline GMM regressions, two specifications are based on the full sample whereas the two 
other specifications correspond to a partial sample. In Table 5, positive net effects from public 
credit registries are apparent in the 0.25
th
 and 0.50
th
 quintiles.  
  
4. Conclusion and future research directions  
 This study has investigated the role of information sharing offices in market power in 
the African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 
42 countries for the period 2001-2011. Five simultaneity-robust estimation techniques have 
been employed, namely: (i) Two Stage Least Squares; (ii) Instrumental Fixed effects to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (iii) Instrumental Tobit regressions to control for the 
limited range in the dependent variable; (iv) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to 
control for persistence in market power and (v) Instrumental Quantile Regressions (QR) to 
account for initial levels of market power.  
 The following findings have been established from non-interactive regressions. First, 
the effects of information sharing offices are significant in the Two Stage Least Squares, with 
a positive effect from private credit bureaus. Second, in GMM, public credit registries 
increase market power.  Third, from Quintile Regressions, private credit bureaus consistently 
increase market power throughout the conditional distributions of market power. 
 Given that the above findings are contrary to theoretical postulations, we have 
extended the analytical framework with interactive regressions in order to assess whether the 
anticipated effects can be established if information sharing offices are increased. The 
extended findings show: (i) a negative net effect from public credit registries on market power 
in GMM regressions; (ii)  negative net impacts from public credit registries on market power 
in the in the 0.25
th
 and 0.50
th
 quintiles of market power.  It is important to note that 
insignificant effects established in the findings can be logically elicited. These insignificant 
results imply that information sharing offices are still not having an apparent effect in the 
reduction of market power in the African banking industry. There are two likely arguments 
with which to clarify this insignificance. From a direct viewpoint, information sharing offices 
may not be fulfilling their fundamental goal of increasing competition in the banking sector, 
reducing information rents and rendering credit markets contestable (see  Pagano & Jappelli, 
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1993, p. 2019).  From an indirect perspective, complementary instruments of information 
sharing offices like information and communication technology and government institutions 
may not be adequate in enabling information sharing offices to disclose time and adequate 
information.  
The authenticity of credit bureaus can ease exchanges of information among banks in 
order to reduce information cost, bank risk level and credit costs when banks such as Bank of 
Africa, Ecobank and Attijariwafa Bank are expanding their operations to a regional market 
(Buch, 2003). However, African credit bureaus may not be able to provide high quality of 
information disclosure (e.g. correctness, accurateness, comprehensiveness; discipline of 
borrowers, credit availability etc). This may indicate the above non-significant relationship.  
In addition,  this non-significant link may be due to lack of good institutional framework such 
as weak legal systems, lack of sufficient regulatory environments and best practice, 
particularistic culture, relationships network ties and use of different language.  For instance, 
national culture oriented towards particularistic culture “favour strong personal relationships 
in which there is a shared set of norms and values” (Michailova & Hutchings, 2006, p.395). 
Hence, the absence of well-functioning formal credit bureaus in Africa may yield inefficiency 
in the banking system due to this type of national culture. If the African national culture is 
dominated by universalism, information sharing would be better synchronised through the 
application of standards, rules and legal contracts which each credit bureau has to stick to. 
Hence, to our best knowledge, no study has found this insignificant relationship in the African 
banking system. As a result, this study has remedied this deficiency and advances our 
understanding in the context of information sharing offices → market power in Africa (Luoto, 
McIntosh & Wydick, 2007). In addition to particularistic national culture coupled with 
embryonic development stage, information asymmetry may play a key role in market power 
which raises a new inquiry for further investigation.  
In the light of these clarifications, the insignificant results should not be seen in the 
light of a file drawer problem or publication bias in social sciences, where null or insignificant 
results are discarded in favour of strong findings (Rosenberg, 2005; Franco et al., 2014). In 
essence, both significant and insignificant results make economic sense and have economic 
meanings. Future studies can improve the existing literature by examining complementary 
policy tools that enhance the role of information sharing services in reducing market power. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of  Variables Sources 
    
Market Power  Lerner The ratio of the ‘difference between the 
Marginal Cost and Price’ on the Price 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Quantity  of Loans  Quantity Logarithm of Loans   BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
Public credit registries   PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Private credit bureaus  PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
Market 
Power 
Lerner 0.513 0.587 0.032 0.969 893 
       
Information Public credit registries  2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
Sharing Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
       
 
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita 
growth 
13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
 
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 3 : Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 684) 
                 
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls Info. Sharing Lerner  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. PCR PCB   
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 0.019 -0.163 -0.016 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.205 -0.178 -0.062 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.546 -0.233 0.035 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.038 -0.083 0.021 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.602 0.139 0.109 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.342 0.094 0.082 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 0.007 -0.038 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 -0.084 0.080 -0.056 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 0.084 -0.080 0.056 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.010 0.187 0.147 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.010 -0.187 -0.147 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.014 -0.071 0.006 Islam 
            1.000 0.014 0.071 -0.006 NonIsl. 
             1.000 -0.151 0.051 PCR 
              1000 0.091 PCB 
               1.000 Lerner 
                 
Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small 
banks. Lsize: Large banks. Open: Capital openness. Closed: Capital closedness. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: 
Quantity of Loans.  
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0750 for n = 684 
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